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SINCE THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY IS A
FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT POSSESSED
BY A
CR1M1NAL
DEFENDANT,
WHAT MUST A TRIAL
COURT DO TO GUARANTEE
THAT A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT
ACTUALLY
DECIDES
FOR HIMSELF
WHETHER
OR NOT TO TESTIFY
AT HIS OWN
TRIAL?
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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF
CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS
IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION
FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

THE NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION

OF CRIMINAL

DEFENSE
LAWYERS
(NACDL)
files this amicus brief
pursuant to this Court's Rule 37.2(a) in support of Michael
K. Leggett's
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Both
petitioner
and respondent
have granted amicus NACDL
consent to file this brief, and letters of consent have been
filed with the Clerk of this Court.
INTEREST

OF AMICUS

NACDL
is a nonprofit corporation
with over 10,000
attorneys
and 28,000 affiliated members
in all fifty states.
The NACDL was founded in 1958 to advance the study of
the theory and practice of criminal law, to publish on the
subject of criminal practice, and to promote the integrity,
independence
and skill of the criminal defense bar. One
objective of NACDL
is to ensure that defense attorneys
have the ability to provide zealous representation
to their
clients, as required by the Sixth Amendment
to the United
States Constitution.
In particular,
one of the concerns of
NACDL is to ensure that defense counsel have the ability
to aggressively
and effectively
represent
their clients,
without the threat of criminal prosecution
under broadly
i No counsel for any party to this case authored this brief in whole or
in part, and no person or entity, other than NACDL and its members,
made any monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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drafted criminal charges. Otherwise, the government
use its prosecutorial
discretion to chill zealous
representation.
SUMMARY

may

OF THE ARGUMENT

In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), this Court
explicitly held that a defense at a criminal trial has a
constitutional
right to testify on her own behal£ This
holding came as no surprise, since this Court had often
suggested in dicta that such a right exists.
It is now the task of American
this right.

courts to vindicate

First, it must be recognized that the right to testify is
a personal right of the defendant.
This means that the
decision to testify cannot be characterized
as merely a
"tactical" decision left to defense counsel. Rather, in both
Rock v. Arkansas and Jones v. Barnes this Court strongly
suggests that this crucial decision must be made personally
by the defendant.
But in order for the defendant to exercise this right,
he must first be aware he has such a right. Thus, a
mechanism must be established so that the trial judge
and/or defense counsel properly informs the defendant of
this right. The defendant must understand that he or she is
ultimately responsible for this decision. Finally, if the
defendant chooses not to testify, the record must contain a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver from the
defendant.
A silent record can no longer substitute for a
constitutionally
proper personal waiver.
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REASONS

FOR GRANTING

WRIT

This court has held that the defendant in a criminal
case has a constitutional
right to testify in his own defense.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S 44 (1987) It has characterized
this right as being "fundamental". Rock, at 52. This court
has also indicated in very strong dictum that the decision
whether to testify is one of the few that resides solely with
the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). And,
the waiver of a fundamental
right should be made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
Thus, it appears settled that the decision to testify is
a right that belongs solely to the criminal defendant.
Yet
years ago this court astutely observed that "[A] right
without a remedy is no right at all." Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183, 209 (1947). As the facts of this case
illustrate, judicial assurances to a defendant that he alone
may decide whether to testify are simply empty promises if
there is no mechanism for determining what the defendant
really wants. This court should grant the petition for
certiorari in this case to demand that trial judges must
obtain personally from a criminal defendant a knowing,
intelligent, voluntary, in-court waiver of the right to testify,
at least in those cases where the judge is put on notice that
there may be a disagreement
between defense counsel and
defendant on this issue.

Ie

ROCK v. ARKANSAS
MADE EXPLICIT
WHAT
HAD LONG BEEN IMPLICITLY
RECOGNIZED
BY THIS COURT:
THAT A DEFENDANT
HAS
A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TESTIFY
ON HIS OWN BEHALF
In a narrow sense, it is accurate to say that Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) is the first case in which this
Court explicitly held that a defendant has a constitutional
right to testify at her trial. But it is certainly not a "new
rule" as that term of art is defined in Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989). Rock was simply the first time this Court
was forced to specifically recognize this fundamental
constitutional
right.
There has been no dearth of language in this Court's
opinions establishing that some kind of "right to be heard"
is an essential component of due process· Thus, in 1897
the Court declared: "At common law no man was
condemned without being afforded opportunity to be heard·
·.. Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a
right to be heard in one's defence?" Hovey v. Elliott, 167
U.S. 409, 415,417 (1897). The following year, the Court
said that the concept of due process included "certain
immutable principles of justice..,
as that no man shall be
condemned in his person or property without..,
an
opportunity of being heard in his defense." Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-390 (1898). This statement was
approvingly cited by the Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68 (1932). In dictum in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948), the Court provided details on just what this "right
to be heard" entailed. The Court said it "include[d], as a
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to
offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." Id. at

273 (emphasis added). Again, in Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62 (1954), the Court alluded to a right to testify
when it stated, "Of course, the Constitution guarantees a
defendant the fullest opportunity
to meet the accusation
against him." 347 U.S. at 65.
In the years prior to Rock, the Court continued to
suggest that the right to testify was constitutionally
predicated. In Harris v. New York,401 U.S. 222 (1971),
the Court stated that "[e]very criminal defendant is
privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do
so." 401 U.S. at 225 (1971). The next year in Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Court stated that
"[w]hether the defendant is to testify is an important
tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional
right."
406 U.S. at 612. In 1975 the Court wrote that "[I]t is now
accepted..,
that an accused has a right..,
to testify on his
own behal£" Faretta v.California, 422 US 806, 819, n.
15 (1975) (citing Harris v. New York,401 U.S. 222, 225
(1971)). When the majority opinion in Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986), averred that the Court had
"never explicitly held that a criminal defendant has a due
process right to testify on his own behalf', Justice
Blackmun responded in his concurrence that he was
"somewhat
puzzled" by the majority's assertion that this
could be an "open question" and reviewed the Court's
earlier work in this field. 475 U.S. at 186, n. 5 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
Thus, Rock is a constitutional anti-climax. The
Supreme Court had long indicated that a constitutional
basis for a defendant's right to testify was a foregone
conclusion.

H*

THE DECISION
TO TESTIFY
IS A PERSONAL
DECISION
WHICH
CAN ONLY BE MADE BY
THE DEFENDANT
HIMSELF
Whether or not a defendant testifies is one of the
limited number of trial decisions to important that only the
defendant can make it.
The mere fact a defendant has a constitutional
right
does not mean that the defendant must personally exercise
that fight. For example, a defendant has a constitutional
right both to call witnesses and to cross-examine
the State's
witnesses.
Yet these are characterized
as "strategic and
tactical decisions" which are commonly exercised by
defense counsel. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standard 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993).
On the other hand, some rights are so basic that
only the defendant himself may waive them. For example,
a jury trial can be waived only with a criminal defendant's
"express, intelligent consent." Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942); accord, Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). A guilty plea cannot
be taken without the defendant's personal agreement.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The decision
whether or not to appeal a conviction belongs solely to the
defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)
(dictum).
Rock v. Arkansas had no reason to decide whether
the right to testify is the kind of right which requires a
personal waiver for the defendant or whether it is in the
area of "trial tactics" to be left to the defense attorney. Yet

Rock strongly suggested that only the defendant may make
this decision.
First, Rock characterized the defendant's right to
testify as a "fundamental"
constitutional
right. 483 U.S. at
53, n. 10. Similarly, when the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), formulated its watershed test
for establishing waivers by a defendant, it spoke in terms of
"fundamental
constitutional
rights." 304 U.S. at 464. As
one commentator
has noted, "lilt appears that the decisive
factor in the decision to require personal waiver is the
fundamental nature of the right at stake." Developments
in
the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038,
1111 (1970).
Second, when Rock characterized the right to testify
as a "fundamental" constitutional right, it cited Jones v.
Barnes and accompanied that citation with the following
parenthetical:
"(defendant
has the ultimate authority to
make certain fundamental
decisions regarding the case, as
to whether to... testify in his or her own behalf')." 483
U.S. at 53, n. 10. Although not necessary to the decision in
Rock, this statement certainly appears to support the fight
of the defendant to personally make the decision whether or
not to testify.
Third, a careful examination of Jones v. Barnes
lends additional weight to this position. The statement in
Jones that a defendant has ultimate authority on the
decision to testify is dictum. 463 U.S. at 751. Yet the
Court supports this dictum with two citations. One is to a
statement to this effect in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 93, n. 1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
The second
is to the Second Edition of the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice which states that the
decision whether to testify is for the accused to make

personally.
ABA Standards
2.2 (2d ed. 1980).

For Criminal

Justice 4-5.2, 21-

The American Bar Association
has maintained its
position that this is a decision for the defendant alone. In
the Second Edition of the Standards published in 1980, the
A.B.A. recognized only three areas left to the ultimate
decision of the defendant: what plea to enter, whether to
waive jury trial, and whether to testify in his or her own
behalf Id. The Third Edition of the Standards reiterates its
support for a personal decision in these three areas and adds
two more: whether to accept a plea agreement and whether
to appeal. A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard
4-5.2(b)(3d ed. 1993).
Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that every
Circuit which has considered the question has characterized
the fight to testify as one which only the defendant himself
may waive. Brown vArtuz, 124 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1077 (1998).
Thus, the nature of the right to testify will not
support a waiver being made by an attorney. Only the
defendant himself can waive this fundamental
constitutional
right.
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IH.
THERE IS A NEED FOR A MECHANISM
TO GUARANTEE THAT THE DEFENDANT
BOTH UNDERSTANDS
HIS RIGHT TO
TESTIFY AND_ IF HE WAIVES THE RIGHT_
DOES SO VOLUNTAR1LY_
KNOW1NGLY_
AND INTELLIGENTLY
Since only the defendant can waive the right to
testify, there is a need for the trial court to determine
whether the non-testifying
defendant is indeed making such
a waiver. There are essentially two types of such systems:
one in which the trial court takes an active role in making
this determination
and one in which the defense attorney
plays the most important role.
The first type of system is used in both Colorado
and West Virginia. A good description of such a system is
found in the Colorado case establishing it, People v. Curtis,
681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984). There the Colorado Supreme
Court assigned the trial judge the burden of ascertaining
whether the defendant has properly exercised such a
waiver, and established
the following procedure:
"A trial court . . . [should]
advis[e]
the
defendant
outside the presence of the
jury that he has a right to
testify, that if he wants to
testify then no one can
prevent him from doing so,
that if he testifies the
prosecution
will be allowed
to cross-examine
him, that if

he has been convicted of a
felony the prosecutor will be
entitled to ask him about it
and thereby disclose it to-the
jury, and that if the felony
conviction is disclosed to the
jury then the jury can be
instructed to consider it only
as it bears
upon his
credibility.
[T]he
defendant
should also be
advised that he has a right not
to testify and that if he does
not testify then the jury can
be instructed
about that
right."
681 P.2d at 514.
The Colorado approach was adopted in West
Virginia (State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1988))
and has received favorable comment in Mississippi.
See
Culbertson v. State, 412 So.2d 1184, 1186-87 (Miss.
1982)(Colorado
system suggested but possibly not
required).
Recently, Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming have
also stressed the need for an on-the-record
waiver of the
right to testify. (See Petition, pages 15-16).
Yet in response to criticism that this procedure may
result in the trial judge inadvertently
influencing a
defendant's
decision, an alternative system has been
proposed to guarantee a proper on-the-record
waiver for a
non-testifying
defendant.
See Timothy P. O'Neill,
Vindicating the Defendant's
Constitutional
Right to Testify
at a Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-Record
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Waiver, 51 U. Pitt_ L. Rev. 809 (1990). This alternative
system is comprised of the following six steps:
1.
At ever criminal trial, the defendant must
either a) testify on his own behalf or b) waive his right to
testify on the record.
2.
Consistent with AB.A Standards, it is the
responsibility
of the defense attorney to tell the defendant
a) that the defendant has the right to testify and b) that,
although the defense attorney will offer advice on this
matter, the ultimate decision of whether to testify rests with
the defendant.
3.
If, after weighing the advice of counsel, the
defendant decides not to testify, it is the responsibility
of
the defense attorney to request a hearing outside the
presence of the jury at some point during the defense case.
4.
At this hearing, through questions posed by
the defense attorney, the defendant should affirm that a) he
understands he has the right to testify; b) that he
understands that no one can prevent him from exercising
this right; c) that if he testifies the prosecutor will have the
opportunity to cross-examine
him; and, if applicable, d)
that there is a possibility that his testimony might be
impeached with prior criminal convictions.
His waiver
should then be made orally as part of the trial record.
5.
A written waiver should also be made part
of the trial record.
6.
As a general rule, the prosecution and the
trial judge should play no role in the proceedings.
However, the trial judge may pose questions to the
defendant and/or the defense counsel if the judge, in her
11

discretion, believes that there is evidence that the defendant
is not making a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to testify.
The preceding two systems are merely examples.
Yet some mechanism is needed to vindicate this
fundamental
right. A mechanism is especially necessary in
cases such as the one at bar where the trial judge is apprised
both of the defendant's
wish to testify and of the defense
attorney's opposition to this decision. (See Petition, App.
25-29). It is not enough for the trial judge to say, as did the
judge in the case at bar, that he did not want to raise the
issue in open court because he was afraid the defendant
"might jump up and say he wanted to testify." (Petition,
App. 29). It is imperative that this Court provide guidance
on how trial courts should act to vindicate this most
precious of rights.

12

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, NACDL urges this Court
to grant the writ of certiorari to address the important issues
presented.
Respectfully

submitted,

Counsel of Record:
Timothy P. O'Neill
Professor of Law
The John Marshall Law School
315 S. Plymouth Ct.
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 987-2367
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